Bougainville is a mountainous island with
three live volcanoes. Rainfall is heavy and flooding and disrupted
communications not unusual.
Most Bougainvilleans are Melanesians though
there are Polynesians on an outlying atoll that is part of the province. All
are Christians of various denominations, with the Catholic Church having strong
roots in the province. About 20 languages are spoken on Bougainville.
Bougainvillean Children (Photo: thecommonwealth.org)
The principal regional problems in Papua
New Guinea have concerned Bougainville, which is geographically, historically
and culturally more closely linked to the western Solomon Islands. Only in the
twentieth century, under colonialism, did traditional social and economic links
become modernized and oriented westwards. Bougainvilleans are black, a characteristic
which is shared in the Pacific by only a few peoples in the adjacent Solomon
Islands. For most of the colonial era, Bougainville was neglected, and
Bougainvilleans have always claimed cultural and ethnic uniqueness.
Colonial neglect of Bougainville ended in
1964 when a huge copper deposit was confirmed at Panguna, in the interior
mountains. Villagers opposed exploration and land alienation, emphasizing their
feelings of separateness. This attitude was promoted by the nationalist
Napidakoe Navitu movement which sought a referendum on whether Bougainville
should remain within Papua New Guinea. The administration refused to hold such
referendum, but in 1973 the island was allowed to have the first provincial
government in the country as a concession to emergent nationalism. Pressure for
secession continued. Almost all the prominent secessionists were Roman
Catholics, and the Catholic Church was closely tied to the search for an
independent cultural identity. Secession was sought both in defence of identity
and in search of the material rewards of mining.
The province declared its independence on 1
September 1975, just two weeks before Papua New Guinea became independent.
After six months the so-called Republic of the North Solomons effectively
disintegrated. Although the two key issues that had contributed to secession
remained, secessionist aspirations declined in the post-independence years as
mining brought considerable wealth and rapid social change. However, despite
growing incomes and access to services, concern increased over the
environmental damage caused by the mine and there was resentment over the
distribution of mining profits, the immigration of workers from elsewhere in
Papua New Guinea, and other social problems. Secessionist sentiments were
rekindled and resurfaced in dramatic form in 1989 when militant landowners
opposed the Panguna copper mine. Since then the struggle for Bougainvillean
secession has provided the strongest challenge ever to the basis and stability
of the Papua New Guinea nation, and the most serious political and humanitarian
issue in Oceania since the war.
Throughout the 1980s, women landowners near
the mine site raised concern over a range of social and environmental impacts
from the Panguna mine, and a younger generation of landowners challenged their
elders, arguing that the compensation and royalty deals could not address the
widespread social and cultural impacts of mining. Mounting grievances over
mining in 1988 evolved into a more general pressure for secession. The police
force was unable to end the militancy, a national government Peace Package was
rejected, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) emerged, led by Sam Kauona
and Francis Ona, and the mine finally closed in September 1989. In 1990 the
national government announced a total blockade of goods and services to the
province, a decision quickly followed by the unilateral declaration of
independence of the Republic of Bougainville. By this time the BRA was in
apparent control of much of the island, though in the northern island of Buka
support for the rebellion was hesitant. An interim government was established
on Bougainville, with Francis Ona as President. From then onwards an effective
communications blackout largely limited information from the island, though
there were health problems and the economy and other services were collapsing.
Papua New Guinea and Bougainville leaders held talks on board a New Zealand
ship, the Endeavour, off Kieta in mid-1990 which resulted in the Endeavour
Accord.
The Endeavour Accord, which stated that
services to Bougainville would be restored and that the long-term political
status of Bougainville would be reconsidered, did not hold. Papua New Guinea
troops landed on Buka in September 1990 and restored some semblance of
government control, but not without force. Civil war was waged there for
several months, and human rights abuses in various parts of the province were
documented on both the Papua New Guinea and BRA sides. PNGDF (Papua New Guinea
Defence Force) troops were supported by pro-PNG ‘Resistance’ militias, which
led to fratricidal conflicts with BRA forces.
By the end of 1992 most of the north and
centre of Buka and parts of south-western Bougainville were under government
control. The area around the Panguna mine remained under BRA control and there
was sporadic violence in the marginal areas. The Bougainville crisis
contributed to increased conflict in the neighbouring Solomon Islands, as the
Solomons’ police increased their military capacity to cope with cross-border
raids by PNGDF troops in hot pursuit of BRA militants and civilian refugees.
Government forces entered the town of Arawa
in February 1993 and in 1994 the government temporarily gained control of
Panguna. Further attempts were made to secure a political resolution of the
crisis and services were restored to more areas of Bougainville. A change of
government in August 1994 led to Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan giving primacy
to a peace initiative for Bougainville. A ceasefire was declared, a South
Pacific Peacekeeping Force was introduced and a peace conference organized at
Arawa. A Bougainville Transitional Government was established in March 1995,
operating through eight local interim authorities but the Premier, Theodore
Miriung, was murdered in October 1996.
It was not until 1997 that effective peace
was restored to the island, following the Sandline crisis and the fall of the
government of Sir Julius Chan.
By 1997, the conflict in Bougainville
between the PNGDF and the BRA had come to a military stalemate, with the PNG
government unable to defeat the independence movement. The government of then
Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan, fearing the war was creating divisions and
mutiny in the PNGDF, and concerned about international criticism of human
rights abuses by government forces, turned to a foreign corporation for
assistance in recruiting mercenaries, purchasing military equipment and aiming
to recapture the giant Panguna copper and gold mine (which had been closed by
BRA activity).
The London-based corporation Sandline
International recruited personnel from Executive Outcomes, one of a range of
private corporations established by former military personnel to wage warfare
on behalf of corporate backers or to protect key resource projects like diamond
mines, oil fields or mining projects. Operating widely in Africa, Executive
Outcomes sent African mercenaries, helicopters and weaponry to Port Moresby, in
preparation for an armed assault on BRA areas and Bougainville villages.
The Sandline saga ended in failure, when
the plot was revealed in the media and elements of the PNGDF led by Brigadier
General Jerry Singirok rose up in protest and refused to allow the mercenaries
to commence their operations in Bougainville. In March 1997, the mercenaries
were captured at gunpoint by PNGDF soldiers and expelled from the country. The
1997 Sandline crisis was a significant turning point in Papua New Guinea
politics, contributing to Prime Minister Chan’s loss of office in July 1997
elections and leading to peace negotiations to settle the Bougainville war.
The 1998 peace settlement opened the way
for amendments to the PNG Constitution and from 2001 Bougainville was no longer
a province of Papua New Guinea but an ‘autonomous political entity’. The adoption
in December 2004 of a new constitution led to it becoming an ‘autonomous
region’ with ‘higher autonomy’ within PNG. Although the majority of financial
support for the new region continues to come from PNG, the Autonomous
Bougainville Government (ABG) has wide-ranging powers over all but foreign
affairs, defence and finance; it is moving towards financial autonomy and has a
distinct status in terms of foreign aid.
In May 2005, Bougainvillean voters elected
an autonomous government led by President Joseph Kabui, a former BRA leader who
later engaged in peace negotiations with Papua New Guinea. The death of BRA
founder Francis Ona in July 2005, apparently from malaria, will hamper the
project of the Republic of Mekamui, the self-proclaimed government in central
Bougainville, which refused to join the peace process in the late 1990s.
Followers of Francis Ona, mainly in the mountains around the now defunct
Panguna copper mine, have not been absorbed into the ABG, and remain a force of
dissent. Bougainville will vote on its final political status after 2015.
Though the crisis did not fragment Papua
New Guinea, it resulted in massive devastation in Bougainville. The economy
disintegrated, hundreds of lives were lost, children missed years of education,
communities and families were torn apart, new divisions and hatreds emerged and
old divisions were rekindled and, almost a decade after the restoration of
peace and regional civil authority in most areas other than around Panguna,
problems of reconciliation remained. The extensive blockade of Bougainville,
the refusal to allow the International Red Cross or medical supplies to enter
for long periods of time, or to give journalists access to the island, and the
difficulties placed in the way of Amnesty International led to considerable
external criticism of the manner in which Papua New Guinea was seeking to
resolve the crisis. The crisis disturbed relations between Papua New Guinea and
both Australia and the Solomon Islands.
Despite cultural divisions, almost all
Bougainvilleans are Melanesians and there are no significant regional
antipathies. A Polynesian minority exists on outlying atolls north of
Bougainville but does not experience discrimination. The principal challenge
remains to establish a viable economy for Bougainville, and what role a mine
might take in that.
The autonomous government has faced ongoing
problems with some supporters of the late Francis Ona in the no-go zone near
the Panguna mine, who have refused to accept the peace process. This has been
compounded by the activities of criminal elements, such as the alleged conman
Noah Musingkuh, who has reportedly used Fijian mercenaries to train dissident
militias in areas of the ‘Republic of Mekamui’.